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GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION AND
DEFAULT PENALTIES
NUNO GOUVEIA1
Abstract. We introduce a two-period general equilibrium model with uncertainty and incom-
plete financial markets, where default is allowed and agents face in case they do default an utility
penalty, which is their own private information. In this setting, if agents have heterogeneous
characteristics they will generally pay different returns on any given asset, and thus the same
promise made by different agents is in fact not equivalent. If asset trading is anonymous, then
the same price is paid for promises whose value can be in fact quite different, and very severe
adverse selection problems may arise as consequence. We thus incorporate in the above model
an alternative way to negotiate the financial assets, under which an equilibrium exists and the
adverse selection problem is mitigated. Succinctly, consumers trade assets non-anonymously
with a set of financial intermediaries not allowed to default.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Motivation. In the literature on general equilibrium theory under uncertainty, a growing
attention has been given in recent years to issues such as the possibility of default in the payment
of asset returns, or the existence of asymmetric information about the value of asset returns.
These two distinct lines of research have been dissociated one from another, but one can conceive
situations where a borrower is allowed to default and knows better than the lender what will be his
or her future default level. Concretely, when default is allowed, we need some sort of mechanism to
guarantee that borrowers will optimally choose to repay some positive amount in equilibrium, since
otherwise nobody would buy assets. In the literature there are three basic types of assumptions
made to enforce a positive level of payment: (i) the existence in the economy of some durable good
that can serve as collateral and that can be seized if the debtor defaults, (see Dubey, Geanakoplos
and Zame [9], for example), (ii) the existence of a default penalty in each debtor’s utility function
(usually proportional to the level of default), which would reflect a pain of conscience from not
keeping his or her promises, or the cost of social disapproval, or still the loss in utility caused by
the enforcement of legal sanctions such as a sentence convicting the defaulter to some time in jail
Date: January, 31st 2005.
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(see for example Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [8]), or (iii) an hybrid combination of the last
two assumptions, in which debtors suffer a penalty relative to the value of default not covered by
the collateral (see again for example Dubey, Geanakoplos and Shubik [8]). The introduction of
collateral, for instance, can be very advantageous, since it allows for example to guarantee existence
of equilibrium in an economy with incomplete markets and infinite horizon (see Arau´jo, Pa´scoa
and Torres-Mart´ınez [6]).
When we introduce default penalties, it seems reasonable to assume that their level is private
information of each borrower, and that lenders do not observe them. In the existing models with
asymmetric information relative to future asset returns, the usual approach is to consider that
assets are traded anonymously and/or pooled together. The drawback with this approach is that
the asset price will reflect an expected average repayment rate, so it will be relatively low for
sellers with high repayment rates, and vice-versa. This may possibly lead to the vanishing of asset
markets, exactly in the same fashion as in Akerlof’s [1] lemons model.
To make the introduction of non-anonymous bilateral negotiation worthwhile1, it must incorpo-
rate some sort of signaling mechanism. In order to get an equilibrium existence result, this signaling
mechanism cannot be too complex. The signaling mechanism introduced in our model will be the
simplest one could imagine: the buyer asks the sellers how much they want to borrow, before fixing
a price for the asset. This will be revealing because the lower an agent’s default penalties are, the
more assets he or she will want to sell at any given price. Although he or she will be making the
announcement before the buyer names a price, he or she does so with a given expectation he or
she forms about this price, which must be correct in equilibrium. The buyer in turn, will have a
strategy such that the more an agent announces he or she wants to borrow, the lower the price he
or she will set. If this strategy function is sufficiently steep, it is possible that even the types with
lower default penalties will prefer to borrow a small amount. In equilibrium the asset price and
the expected repayment rate will be higher when the asset is negotiated according to this simple
signaling mechanism2 3.
One may wonder which type of incentive compatibility constraints will the buyers have to
satisfy such that the sellers’ announcements disclose some useful information about their type. In
the particular setting we will adopt we will not need such constraints. Suppose that the number
of consumers is very large (but finite, to keep things relatively simple), and that they can be
separated in a relatively small number of groups with similar characteristics, including the default
penalties they face. Then, a buyer can perfectly choose the same price for the assets sold by all
these homogeneous consumers, and since each one is relatively small in comparison with the size of
the group with characteristics alike, the particular announcement he or she makes can be assumed
to have no impact in the price he or she will receive, such that each and every one of them will
act as a price-taker. Then, the announcement they will make will simply be the optimal choice
given the (constant) price they expect to pay. To have a term of comparison, we will also analyze
what happens when buyers name prices before and then sellers choose quantities. In this case
there is no signal to the buyers until the moment they have to form a price (or a return), and so
their decision will be the same to every type. As it is easy to guess, this negotiation process will
yield very similar results to those of a situation where assets are traded anonymously or pooled
together. Also, in this case we do not seem to be able to find an equilibrium existence result, due
to a non-convexity in the asset buyers’ problem.
The introduction of a monopolistic component in the model is aimed precisely at counter weight-
ing the negative effect of the information asymmetry. I drew this idea from partial equilibrium
literature, where very often the solution to improve on the gains from a bilateral negotiation passes
1We assume that the costs of bilateral negotiation are null.
2Also because when the types with lower penalties get less indebted their optimal repayment rates go up.
3If the default penalties are state-dependent the announcement sellers make will never fully uncover their true
type, since the signal is a one-dimensional variable and their type is multi-dimensional.
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by giving to the part which can be hurt the most the negotiation power. In this kind of literature
the message is that an ”anomaly”, so to speak, can be compensated by another ’anomaly’ in order
to drive the equilibrium to a superior outcome. And I think that if this is idea holds in many partial
equilibrium models, why shouldn’t it also hold in general equilibrium models; this papers’ main
messages has two parts that cannot be dissociated: the introduction of bilateral negotiation as
opposed to anonymous negotiation can improve on the outcome, but only if sufficient negotiation
power is given to the part which has no private information.
The present model will have some resemblance with the models in either Arau´jo, Orrillo e
Pa´scoa [4] and Arau´jo, Fajardo e Pa´scoa [2]. The main difference between those models and the
one presented in this paper is that there we have the presence of some spread functionals that
allow the consumers to compute the price they will receive from their sales of assets depending
on the amount of collateral they put up to back the promises they make, while here they will
face different prices for their short sales simply in function of their identity. This paper has also
in this aspect a close similitude with Bisin and Gottardi [7], where they first introduced financial
intermediaries who charge bid-ask spreads, and show that this limits the gains that traders can
obtain using their informational advantage over the agents in the other side of the market, thus
leading to an existence of equilibrium result.
1.2. Summary. The economic structure is fully described in detail in section 2. In section 3 we
study the equilibrium properties regarding adverse selection problems, and argue that if indexed
assets are negotiated in a certain manner that may lead agents to disclose some of their private
information (that is, with the signaling mechanism already discussed above), these problems can
be lessened and economic efficiency can thus be increased. In section 4 the existence of such
equilibrium is established. Finally, in the appendix, the optimization problem of the consumers
and the financial intermediaries is given close attention.
2. Model Structure
2.1. Basic Framework. In the real world, individuals do not generally trade assets directly with
each other. Most often they trade assets with a relatively small number of financial institutions
and financial intermediaries. Also very often the assets they can purchase are different from the
ones they can sell. The returns in each side of the market will not be in general equal, although
correlated. Because there is great concern about bank failures in modern societies, it seems natural
that the financial intermediaries may suffer a significantly higher default sanction in case of default
than a consumer. We will take this to an extreme by assuming that the financial intermediaries
in our model face an infinite default penalty in every state of nature. So, we will consider a two
period economy with uncertainty, where there are two types of assets and two types of traders.
The traders are divided between consumers (or agents) and financial intermediaries, which we
will call bankers. The assets are divided between primitive assets, which promise to pay a given
non-negative, state contingent, amount in the second period, and indexed assets whose promised
returns in each state are a weighted average of the primitive assets promised returns in that state.
Only bankers are allowed to sell the primitive assets, and only consumers are allowed to sell the
indexed assets; bankers are also allowed to buy both types of assets, but consumers can only buy
primitives. Consumers thus cannot trade directly between them in the financial markets. Indexed
assets will be sold at a discount price: their price will be assumed to be equal to the weighted
average of the primitive asset prices, minus a certain spread. Primitive assets are standardized and
non-exclusive; indexed assets are non-standardized, as the spread may be different for different
pairs of buyers and sellers. Agents are allowed to default, but they suffer a subjective default
penalty in their utility; bankers are not allowed to do so. Agents have private information about
their subjective default penalties.
Our notation and assumptions are the following:
t = {0, 1} periods in time.
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S = {1, ..., S} the set of states of nature in period 1. We take S = {0} ∪ S.
H = {1, ...,H} the set of consumers.
B = {1, ..., B} the set of bankers.
L = {1, ..., L} the set of consumption goods.
whs ∈ RL++ the endowment of consumer h ∈ H in state s ∈ S.
wbs ∈ RL++ the endowment of banker b ∈ B in state s ∈ S.
xhs ∈ RL+ the consumption bundle of consumer h ∈ H in state s ∈ S.
xbs ∈ R+ the consumption bundle of banker b ∈ B in state s ∈ S.
psl ∈ R+ the price in units of account of commodity l ∈ L in state s ∈ S
P = {1, ..., P} the set of (linearly independent) primitive assets, P 6 S.
q ∈ R+ the price in units of account of primitive asset p ∈ P.
aps ∈ R+ the return of primitive asset p in state s ∈ S.
φhp ∈ R+ the purchases of primitive asset p ∈ P by agent h ∈ H.
ϕbp ∈ R the purchases of primitive asset p ∈ P by banker b ∈ B.
ψbh ∈ R+ the quantity of indexed asset sold by agent h ∈ H banker b ∈ B.
δb ∈ int∆B−1 the indexant used by banker b ∈ B.
rsb = δ
bA
′
s the return promised by the indexed asset b, where As = (a
p
s)p∈P .
γbh the spread asked by banker b ∈ B to agent h ∈ H for the purchase of one unit of indexed
asset b ∈ B.(
δbq − γbh
)
the price in units of account of each unit of indexed asset b ∈ B.
θhs ∈ [0, 1] the repayment rate of consumer h ∈ H in state s ∈ S.4
λhs ∈ Λhs =
[
λhs , λ
h
s
]
the default utility penalty faced by agent h ∈ H in state s ∈ S.
σhs (λ
h
s ) : Λ
h
s → [0, 1] the probability distribution of λhs ,
The weights vectors δb are exogenous: each different banker b is allowed to trade only assets
indexed to the returns of a specific portfolio with weights vector δb, where we assume that δb 6= δb′ ,
for every b 6= b′.5 6
We assume that bankers consume only one commodity, which we can take, without loss of
generality, to be good l = 1. One interpretation is that bankers are art lovers whose utility only
depends on the number of rare paintings they purchase, or that they only care about the amount
of gold they accumulate. The objective is to model bankers as real profit maximizers, the profit
being measured by the quantity they can purchase of a specific commodity.
We consider two possible negotiation rules for the spreads γbh: (i) γ
b
h is chosen by the bankers and
then agents choose ψbh (hereafter rule I )
7 8, or (ii) bankers first ask each agent to choose ψbh, before
4One might wonder if we do not need to impose some rule determining how an agent who owes two different
bankers should split his payments between them in case he defaults. We will assume that the agent has to pay to
every banker in proportion to the value of their claims. In this way he or she would be legally forbidden to favor any
banker in prejudice of the rest. This hypothesis also allows us to assume that the default penalties are independent
from b.
5Thus, if B 6 S each banker demands to its debtors a vector of returns linearly independent from those of all
his competitors. This means that if B < S we are thus introducing an element of monopolistic competition in the
model. This hypothesis will be in many cases paradoxically convenient in terms of efficiency, since it gives some
degree of market power to the less informed players in the economy.
6We are thus introducing an element of monopolistic competition in the model. This hypothesis will be in many
cases paradoxically convenient in terms of efficiency, since it gives some degree of market power to the less informed
players in the economy.
7The first rule is intended to parallel models with anonymous negotiation. In the later an asset buyers’ best
guess about the future repayment rate is an average across all individuals in the economy, in this model and under
rule I the asset buyers best guess is an average across all types an agent can have.
8Note that this negotiation rule is equivalent to one in which bankers and agents announce their respective
choices about spreads and borrowings simultaneously, since agents will be able to predict exactly each banker’s
optimal choice in a Nash equilibrium.
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setting the spreads (hereafter rule II ).9 In this paper we establish the existence of equilibrium
when indexed assets are negotiated according to rule II, but we are (apparently) unable to do the
same regarding rule I (see lemma 4.2 and footnote 31 on page 14). But in section 3 we argue and
provide an example showing that rule II can be anyway superior to rule I in terms of efficiency.10
The basic set of relationships can be depicted in the following two figures, the first one for period
0 and the second one for period 1.11 The thick white arrows represent unit of account flows, the
thick grey arrows represent asset flows, and the thin black lines represent commodity flows.
Insert figure 1 here.
Insert figure 2 here.
Note that no assumption is made about if markets are complete. We may either have P = S or
P < S. But the important thing to have in mind is that since agents face a difference in the price
of primitive and indexed assets, even if we have P = S it may be very costly for them to fully span
RS . We can imagine situations in which the spreads are such that
(
δbq − γbh
)
is very close (or even
equal) to zero.
2.2. Agent Types. Agents’ choice will depend on their S marginal disutilities λhs . An agent’s
type must thus be characterized by the vector λh :=
[
λh1 λ
h
2 · · · λhs · · · λhS
]
. This vector
is, a random variable with domain in Λh = Λh1× ...×ΛhS . We assume that σhs (λhs ) may be correlated
across different agents for each s ∈ S.
2.3. Uncertainty. In this model there is not only uncertainty about the state of nature in period
1, but also doubt about the entire matrix
(
λh
)
h∈H , and their induced future deliveries. Since
bankers only care about consumption of good 1 while agents mind about the L commodities
available, then in state s the lower the entries on
(
λhs
)
h∈H are, the higher the equilibrium relative
prices of goods l = 2, .., L will be in terms of good 1. In this model, prediction also involves
trying to figure out what will be the agents’ default rates, and by this means, what will be the
relative price vector in each state. Moreover, this reasoning goes a little deeper: default rates
are themselves influenced by the relative prices since these determine the real value of consumers
endowments, asset revenues and debts, and all these factors influence consumers’ optimal level of
deliveries. Default penalties and future expected relative prices also influence how much consumers
will want to consume, borrow, and lend in period 0 for any given period 0 price vector, implying
that first period equilibrium variables depend also on default penalties.
Since equilibrium prices depend on λ, their observation can disclose some information about the
true matrix λ. We can make different assumptions about the way in which the bankers take infor-
mation out of prices. We may assume that they do not have the necessary sophistication and skills
to perform such heavy computations12. Or we may consider, at the extreme opposite, that they
can at no cost restrain their beliefs about the true value of λ to the set Λ(y0) = {λ : y0 ∈ Y0(λ)} ,
where y0 ≡ (p0, q) and Y0(λ) is the set of period 0 equilibrium price vectors y0 consistent with the
matrix λ.13 The first assumption leads us to the concept of a Walrasian Equilibrium, while the
second one is in line with the notion of a Rational Expectations Equilibrium, as first introduced by
9For a discussion on the different inplications of these two rules, refer to section 3.
10Although it is conceivable that in some situations the worst payers would be better of under rule I, expecially
when they have a low probability.
11Again, note that we are allowing bankers to both buy and sell primitive assets, while agents are forbidden
from selling them short. Hence when a banker buys a primitive, it must be buying it from another banker. This can
be seen as the functioning of a inter-banking monetary market, where financial intermediaries with lack of liquidity
borrow from fellows with excess liquidity.
12Or that they do have but the cost is too high, or even that they are simply too time consuming and cannot
be performed in useful time.
13Note that we do not assume that they extract information from second period price vectors. In period 1 there
is nothing bankers can do to influence consumers’ decisions, so new information is worthless.
6 Nuno Gouveia
Radner [11]. Fortunately, our setting will be general enough to embrace these two different notions
of equilibrium.
The matrix λ has a probability distribution σ : Λ→ [0, 1] , where Λ =∏s∈S∏h∈H Λhs . Bankers’
expectations about λ after observing prices will be denoted by σ(λ|y0), and if we assume that they
extract no information from prices, this will simply be independent from y0. In the case of agents,
they already know their own type, so we replace σ(λ|y0) by σ(λ|y0, λh).
2.4. Optimization Problems.
2.4.1. Agents.
2.4.2. Utility Functions. We assume that each agent has a von-Neumman-Morgenstern utility func-
tion, in which time 0 utility is given by
Uh0 (x
h
0 ) = u
h
0 (x
h
0 )
In each state of period 1 his or her utility will be given by
Uhs (x
h
s , D
h
s ) = u
h
s (x
h
s )− λhsDhs
∀s ∈ S; ∀λs ∈ Λs =
∏H
h=1 Λ
h
s
14, and where Dhs ∈ R+ is his or her level of default in state s, in units
of account. Each agent h gives a subjective probability αhs > 0 to state s ∈ S, with
∑S
s=1 α
h
s = 1.
An agent h with type λh has an expected utility given by
Uh(xh, Dh, λh, y0) = Uh0 (x
h
0 ) +
∑
s∈S
αhsU
h
s (x
h
s , D
h
s ) =
= uh0 (x
h
0 ) +
∑
s∈S
αhs
[
us(xhs )− λhsDhs
]
2.4.3. Budget Constraints. The set of budget constraints in period 0 of agent h is given by
(2.1) p0xh0 + qφ
h 6 p0wh0 +
∑
b∈B
(δbq − γbh)ψbh
(2.2) ψbh ∈ RB+.
From now on we will assume that (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+P−1. 15
In state s of period 1, and for every λ, his budget constraints are
(2.3) ps(λ)xhs (λ) + ps1(λ)θ
h
s (λ)
∑
b∈B
rsbψ
b
h 6 ps(λ)whs + ps1(λ)Asφh
(2.4) θhs (λ) ∈ [0, 1]∑
b∈B r
s
bψ
b
h is agent h’s total debt in state s, so θ
h
s (λ)
∑
b∈B r
s
bψ
b
h is the amount of resources that he
or she dedicates to debt service. His or her default will be equal to Dhs (λ) = (1−θhs (λ))
∑
b∈B r
s
bψ
b
h.
From now on we assume that ps(λ) ∈ ∆L−1, ∀s ∈ S, ∀λ ∈ Λ. The constraints (2.3) and (2.4) are
written in terms of repayment rates, but can alternatively be written in terms of default levels:
(2.5) ps(λ)xhs (λ) + ps1(λ)
[∑
b∈B
rsbψ
b
h −Dhs (λ)
]
6 ps(λ)whs + ps1(λ)Asφh
14Here, consumption bundles and default levels are not presented as functions of agent types and spreads proposed
by bankers; this dependency results only from utility maximization.
15Note that the assumption that δb ∈ int∆P−1, together with wh0  0, guarantees that 2.1 has an interior point,
by choosing ψbh > 0 for some b.
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(2.6) 0 6 Dhs (λ) 6
∑
b∈B
rsbψ
b
h
Although the first representation is more elegant, the second is technically more convenient to
establish the upper semicontinuity of the agents’ best response correspondences. But after that we
simply take θhs (λ) = 1− D
h
s (λ)∑
b∈B r
s
bψ
b
h
and proceed with the first representation.
2.4.4. Bankers.
2.4.5. Utility Functions. Bankers have von-Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions depending only
on consumption of commodity 1, and have infinite default utility penalties. Each banker b gives
a subjective probability βbs > 0 to state s, with
∑
s∈S β
b
s = 1. Thus, banker b expected utility
function will be given by
V b(xb, Db) =
{
V b0 (x
b
0) +
∑
s∈S β
b
sv
b
s(x
b
s1) if D
be = 0
−∞ if Dbe > 0
where Dbe ≡∑s∈S βbsDbs is the banker’s expected default. Notice that if a given banker b attributes
a subjective probability equal to zero to some state s, then we could have this banker planning to
default in that state. To be consistent with the hypothesis of an infinite default penalty we must
impose that βbs > 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀b ∈ B. This is simply a prudential assumption.16
2.4.6. Budget Constraints. In the first period, banker’s b budget constraint is
(2.7) p01xb01 + qϕ
b + (δbq − γbh)
∑
h∈H
ψbh 6 p0wb0.
His constraint for a given state s ∈ S and matrix λ is17
(2.8) ps1(λ)xbs1(λ) 6 ps(λ)wbs +Asϕb +
∑
h∈H
θhs (λ)r
s
bψ
b
h.
2.5. Strategies.
2.5.1. Agents. If we consider rule I agents make their decisions only after observing the spreads
set by the bankers, and always given the relative price vectors he or she expects to face. So,
a strategy under rule I for type λh must be a function of the vectors γh = (γbh)b∈B , y0, and
p1 ≡ {p1s (λN )}λN∈ΛNs∈S . It will depend on y0 not only because y0 affects directly his optimal plan,
but also its observation may change the expectation about p1, by disclosing some information
about the matrix λ−h.
If rule II is considered instead, agents no longer observe spreads before taking their period 0
decisions, but they do so with a given expectation about what these spreads will be, and this
expectation has to be correct in any Nash equilibrium. So, the only difference in the definition of
an agent’s strategy under rules I and II is that in rule II the observed spread vector γh is replaced
by an expected spread vector γeh.
16The only hypothesis about bankers’ preferences towards risk we must postulate is that they cannot be risk-
lovers. In the proof of proposition 1 below we need to assume that the bankers preferences are convex, but not
necessarily strictly so. We can either assume that a banker is risk-averse or risk-neutral. The fact that the bankers
face an infinite default penalty is sufficient to guarantee that they do not take excessive risk even if they are
risk-neutrals, because they must be able to fully pay their debts with probability one.
17In each period the banker will sell the endowment he or she has of commodities l = 2, ..., L, since they do
not enter in his or her utility function, and will buy or sell commodity 1. We need to have wbsl > 0, ∀s ∈ S,
∀l ∈ L, to guarantee that constraints (2.7) and (2.8) have always an interior point (note that q can be equal to
zero). Otherwise, at zero consumption, an eventualy infinite marginal utility of income would conflict with a infinite
default penalty.
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With this slight detail in mind, a strategy under rule II for type λh is thus a function
Φλh(γ
e
h, y0) =
(
xλ
h
0 (γ
e
h, y0),
{
xλ
h
s (γ
e
h, y0)
}S
s=1
, φλ
h
(γeh, y0), ψ
b
λh(γ
e
h, y0),
{
Dλ
h
s (γ
e
h, y0)
}S
s=1
)
:
: RB ×∆L+P−1 → RL(S+1)+ × RP+ × RB+ × RS+.
Let Φh(γeh, y0)(λ
h) denote the mapping that assigns to each λh ∈ Λh the corresponding strat-
egy Φλh(γeh, y0). Bankers’ expectations about the value of agent h choice variables will be given
by the integral
∫
Λh
Φh(γeh, y0)(λ
h)dσh(λh|y0), where σh = Πs∈Sσhs . This includes the expected
consumption plan xhe =
∫
Λh
xh(γeh, y0)(λ
h)dσh(λh|y0), the expected primitive asset purchases
φhe =
∫
Λh
φh(γeh, y0)(λ
h)dσh(λh|y0), the expected borrowing ψeh =
∫
Λh
ψeh(γ
e
h, y0)(λ
h)dσh(λh|y0)
and his or her expected repayment rates vector θhe =
∫
Λh
θh(γeh, y0)(λ
h)dσh(λh|y0) (or alterna-
tively, his or her expected default vector Dhe =
∫
Λh
Dh(γeh, y0)(λ
h)dσh(λh|y0)). At equilibrium18,
these functions must maximize the expected utility function of each agent, and in order for a banker
to be able to derive these expectations he or she must know, besides the distributions σs(λs), the
utility function of each agent, their endowments in each period and in each state, and must have
the necessary sophistication to solve their problem and thus obtain the above integrals.19 20
Remark 2.1. Although the bankers are modeled as a sort of competitive monopolists, their
problem is more complicated than simply taking consumers’ demand functions as given; since they
depend on parameters which are random from the banker’s point of view, the banker has monopoly
power on markets where he simply takes as given expected demand functions. In this model, the
role of rule II will be preciselly to disclose some information about the true demand functions.
2.5.2. Bankers. Banker’s choice variables are his or her consumption in period 0 and in each state
of period 1, his or her portfolio of primitive assets, and the spreads to ask to each agent. But if we
want to model them as profit maximizers in terms of commodity 1, it makes more sense to take
only ϕb and γb as his (financial) decision variables, and simply let his consumption in each state
s ∈ S be given by the equality in his budget constraints, that is,
xb01 =
p0w
b
0 − qϕb − (δbq − γbh)
∑
h∈H ψ
b
h
p01
and
xbs1(λ) =
ps(λ)wbs +Asϕ
b +
∑
h∈H θ
h
s (λ)r
s
bψ
b
h
ps1(λ)
A strategy for banker b must specify the value of his or her decision variables for each vec-
tor y0,21 for each vector γ−b of spreads chosen by the other bankers, and for each array θ ≡{
θhs (λ)
}λ∈Λ
(s,h)∈S×H , since these repayment rates enter in the expression of the functions
{
xbs1(λ)
}λ∈Λ
s∈S .
If we consider rule II the banker’s strategy must depend also on the agents announcements of their
borrowing requirements, ψb ∈ RH+ . So, a strategy for banker b under rule II will be a function
Φb(y0, γ−b, ψb) =
(
ϕb(y0, γ−b, ψb), γb(y0, γ−b, ψb)
)
:
18To be defined below, in section 2.6.
19We are assuming that the bankers know the agent’s entire utility function, except for a single vector of
parameters. This may sound unreasonable, but if the banker’s lack of knowledge were deeper the asymmetric
information problem would be even more complex, and probably unmanageable. But the consumers’ taste for a
certain consumption good can many times be accurately anticipated in real life, so this assumption can have some
reasonability.
20In deriving these functions, it is implicit the use of an expected price vector. If the agents’ expected price
vector differs from the bankers’ expected price vector, the functions derived by the bankers would be different from
the true functions Φλh . Since in equilibrium the players’ expectations must be correct, this problem will not stand
in equilibrium. The same applies for the expected spread vector γeh.
21Since it not only can disclose some private information, but also because it influences the agent’s optimal
choices for whichever their type might be.
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: ∆L+P−1 × R(B−1)H × RH+ → RP × RH .
2.6. Equilibrium. An equilibrium in this model consists in a price vector
p =
(
p0, q, {ps(λ)}s∈S
)
, a family of functions {Φh}h∈H , indicating the strategies of all agents, and
a family of functions {Φb}b∈B indicating the strategies of each one of the B bankers, satisfying
a) the strategies Φh maximize agents’ utility, given all the bankers’ strategies {Φb}b∈B , the price
vector p =
(
p0, q, {ps(λ)}s∈S
)
, and their budget constraints.
b) each banker’s b strategy maximize Φb his or her utility, given all other bankers’ strategies,
the strategies of all agents {Φh}Hh=1, the price vector p =
(
p0, q, {ps(λ)}s∈S
)
, and his or her budget
constraints.
c) market-clearing in every spot market:∑
h∈H
xh0 +
∑
b∈B
xb0 =
∑
h∈H
wh0 +
∑
b∈B
wb0,∑
h∈H
xhs (λ) +
∑
b∈B
xbs(λ) =
∑
h∈H
whs +
∑
b∈B
wbs,∀s ∈ S; a.e. λ ∈ Λ
d) market-clearing in primitive asset markets:∑
h∈H
φh +
∑
b∈B
ϕb = 0.
We do not need to impose market-clearing in the indexed asset market, since bankers do not
choose quantities to buy.
3. Adverse Selection and the Second Negotiation Rule
The equilibrium, whose existence under rule II is demonstrated in section 4, exhibits adverse
selection symptoms. From the formal analysis in the Appendix, we can see in the agents’ first order
conditions (equation (5.2)) that the higher the default penalties are the less the agent will borrow.
When λhs increases for some state s ∈ S, to re-equate ∂L
h
∂ψbh
to zero is necessary to increase µ0, the
period 0 income marginal utility, and to decrease µs, the state s income marginal utility, for each
s ∈ S, and this can only be done by transferring some income from period 0 to period 1, while
borrowing does the reverse role. The effective cost of credit can be broken in two components: the
deliveries that the agent decide to make, and the penalty he suffers against his default. At the
optimal solution the agent will balance these two costs; if the default penalty becomes lower in
one state the total cost of borrowing is now smaller if it is optimal to default in that state, and
remains unchanged otherwise.
It is also shown in the appendix (remark 5.1) that ψbh is decreasing in γ
b
h, as natural. We also
have, again by (5.2) and by the discussion in remark 5.2,
∂2Lh
∂ψbh∂γ
b
h
= −
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
λhs (1− θhs )dσ(λ|y0, λh)−
−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µsθ
h
s dσ(λ|y0, λh) = −
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
min
(
µs, λ
h
s
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh) 6 0
which is higher in absolute value the higher each λhs is, not only because of their direct effect, but
also because a higher λhs leads to a higher repayment rate and smaller consumption in state s, and
thus a to higher income marginal utility µs. The fundamental inference is that agents with higher
default penalties are more responsive to changes in γbh. This is natural, since when λ
h
s is lower the
agent becomes less worried about paying the future returns, and thus more willing to borrow even
at a lower indexed asset price q − γbh. So we have the following picture:
Insert figure 3 here.
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where we are assuming for graphical simplicity that λh1 = λ
h
2 = ... = λ
h
S = λ
h. The higher λh is,
the lower the supply of indexed assets to banker b, for any fixed value of γbh, and the higher the
reduction in ψh when γbh increases from γ
b′
h to γ
b′′
h .
This indexed asset supply behavior has very important implications. A banker would like to
have some way to limit the value of ψbh chosen by the worst types, but the only mechanism available
in our setting is the choice of γbh. He could achieve this goal by asking a sufficiently high spread.
But this would decrease more than proportionally the value of ψbh for the types with higher default
penalties, which is already comparatively low. So, by asking higher spreads the banker will be
driving the best types away from dealing with him, constraining himself to trade indexed assets
only with the ”not so good” types. And he or she could react to this by increasing γbh even further,
with the consequence that only the worst amongst the worst types would still be interested in
selling assets. The result of this process could be, in the limit, and if such a process is unchained
for all pairs banker-consumer, the vanishing of the indexed asset markets. And if the indexed
assets market disappears, the level of trade in the primitive asset markets will also be reduced.
This adverse selection problem is also likely to arise in models where asset markets are anony-
mous. The reason is that the asset price will reflect an average default rate, so that agents that
intend to have a high repayment rate may consider the price too low and decide not to sell the
asset. That would worsen the expected default rate, leading to an increase in the asset price,
unchaining the same kind of market vanishing process.
In this particular model, asymmetric information has a negative effect, even if asset markets
do not vanish. Since agents cannot short-sell primitive assets, even if the number of primitive
assets satisfies P = S, a consumer seen by bankers as being to risky may not be able to choose an
asset portfolio that fully spans RS , because he could face spreads very close to q (or even equal),
rendering high transfers of income from period 1 to period 0 unfeasible or non-optimal for him.22
So, a main issue that should be addressed when asymmetric information is present is to devise
some sort of mechanism that could mitigate these adverse selection distortions. In our setting, if
bankers could impose a limit κbh on ψh, figure 3 would change to
Insert figure 4 here.
κbh would serve to explicitly limit the short sales of the types with lower default penalties, while
at the same time a lower γbh could induce the types with higher default penalties to increase ψ
b
h.
But we are unable to guarantee that such an equilibrium exists, since bankers now would have the
ability to simultaneously determine the price and explicitly influence the quantity traded. This
would introduce a non-convexity in each banker’s strategy set, and the only way we could try to go
around this would be introducing a continuum of bankers (which would not make much economic
sense), but without success. The intuitive reason is that agents do not care about the expected
value of the spreads that each banker propose to them; what matters to agents is which banker
represents the less costly financing opportunity. Our hope would be to use a purification technique
similar to the one used in Arau´jo, Orrillo and Pa´scoa [4] or Arau´jo and Pa´scoa [5], but the agents’
problems in this case will not depend on the bankers’ mixed strategies profile only through a finite
number of expected values, so no purification technique seems feasible.
Nonetheless, bankers can influence the quantity traded, but only implicitly, if they use rule II.
If the banker’s strategy where to ask higher spreads when the announced values of ψbh are also
22This could be seen as an argument in favor of less pungent default penalties, the fact that default may help
agents to obtain full insurance more easily, but at the same time one of the reasons for the spread being too high may
be the fact that the agent has a low default penalty with high probability. The other reason may be the imperfect
competition that exist between the bankers in the choice of spreads. But if the indexants for distinct bankers are
not very different, that is, if δb ≈ δb′ for each b 6= b′, then the spread will tend to be close to zero if the bankers
look at the agents as being reliable debtors, because competition will then be relatively intense (the gain in market
share from a certain decrease in the asked spread will be significant) leading the demanded price to be closer to the
bankers’ marginal cost, in this setting the opportunity cost of funds, that is, q.
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higher, then the agents, anticipating the optimal strategy for the bankers might prefer to choose
a lower ψbh to benefit from a lower spread. A main difference between the two negotiation rules
is that in the first one spreads are independent from the quantities traded, since they are chosen
before, while in the second rule they are not. Rule II displays yet another interesting feature, which
is concomitant with the previous one and reinforces it: the announcement of ψbh may disclose some
new information about the type of agent h. Since bankers know the agents’ entire utility functions
and endowments except the default penalties, and are able to derive their optimal solution for
each vector λh ∈ Λh, bankers could infer from the observation of the optimal choices ψbh something
about the true value of λh.
Since no incentive compatibility constraints are introduced in the bankers’ problem, agents could
try to mislead them by choosing a ψbh below the optimal, in order to take advantage of a lower
spread and then default in period 1 more than bankers were expecting. But if the set H can be
partitioned in J subsets Hj , each one with a sufficiently high cardinality, and such that the agents
belonging to the same partition have highly correlated types,23 this problem can be avoided. The
reason is that since each individual is small relative to the size of his group, the banker’s strategy
can perfectly consist in setting a spread, which can be different for each agent, based not on the
announcement of each agent taken separately, but on the profile of announcements across all agents
in the same group. Then each agent’s announcement will have very little impact on the spread,
and we can assume that in equilibrium every agent will choose their optimal ψbh, with no strategic
consideration whatsoever.24
The main message is that under rule II a nonlinear pricing schedule arises implicitly in each
banker’s strategy, which is not necessarily incentive compatible, but agents choose the ”right”
announcement for their type due to the price-taking hypothesis. In a remarkable paper, Monteiro
and Page [10] established a competitive analogue to the revelation principle, the implementation
principle, and showed that a game between oligopolistic firms facing a consumer possessing private
information, and where the firms’ strategy space is the space of all implementable nonlinear pricing
schedules can be reduced to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs.
They also showed that a Nash equilibrium exists for the mixed extension of the later class of games,
but argue that, since the space of product-price catalogs is not a vector space, no equilibrium can
be shown to exist in pure strategies.
Finally, notice that the assumption that δb
′ 6= δb′′ for b′ 6= b′′ permits the bankers to have higher
flexibility in spread choice, since they have some degree of market power over the agents, so they
can choose steeper spread functions in their optimal strategy than they would otherwise be able
to do.25 26 27
3.1. A ”Simple” Example. Consider an economy with just one commodity, one state of nature
in period 1, one primitive asset, with price q and return r = 1, one banker, and one consumer with
only two equally likely possible types, λ1 = 14 and λ
1
= 34 . The endowments are
(
w10, w
1
1
)
= (1, 2)
for the agent and
(
wb0, w
b
1
)
= (3, 1) for the banker.
23Suppose for example that all academics will face similar default penalties across all states of nature.
24This assumption is by no means different than asssuming that agents act as price takers in a simple finite
dimensional pure exchange economy.
25Monteiro and Page [10] assume that each type utility depends on the identity of the the firm with which he or
she contracts.
26Without this assumption, the spreads in equilibrium do not have to be the same for all bankers, since different
bankers may give different subjective probabilities to different states of nature, thus regarding the same agent
differently.
27If, under rule II, the agents of a certain group HJ announce high ψ
b
s’s, then all bankers will expect to suffer a
high level of default in case they lend to these agents, and will choose high spreads even if δb
′ 6= δb′′ for all b′ 6= b′′.
In fact bankers may end up competing between them to not lend to these agents, leading to γbh = q, for all b ∈ B
and h ∈ Hj .
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Since there is only one market in period 1, we can take the normalization p1 = 1. In period 0
there are two markets open, but by Walras law only one is independent, and by homogeneity we
can normalize p0 = 1, leaving q totally free. The agent’s problem is
Max
{x10,x11,φ1,ψ1,θ1}
U1 = lnx10 + lnx
1
1 − λ1
(
1− θ1)ψ1
s.t.
{ (
x10 − w10
)
+ qφ1 − (q − γ1)ψ1 6 0(
x11 − w11
)
+ θ1ψ1 − φ1 6 0, θ1 ∈ [0, 1]
I totally abstain from presenting the consumer’s best response function, due to its complexity
and size (it would occupy almost an entire page). It is a function with a total of 12 branches, each
one for a different combination of q, γ1 and λ1. Although it is continuous, it exhibits kinks in the
passage between different branches.
Due to the (relative) simplicity of this example, it must be assumed that the banker does not
extract information from the observation of q, because otherwise this would be all he needs to
determine the value of λ1. Assume that his objective function is U b = lnxb0 + lnx
b
1.
It can be shown after some equally messy computations, which have to be made branch by
branch due to the non-differentiability of the above reaction function, that the equilibrium under
negotiation rule I, independently of the true realization of λ1, is such that q = 3 and γ1 > 114 ,
implying q − γ1 6 14 . At such a low indexed asset price neither type wants to sell the indexed
asset, and they are also not interested in buying the primitive asset at such high price. Thus in
this equilibrium financial markets vanish and both individuals have to content themselves with
consuming their endowments.
Under rule II, if the agent does not try to behave strategically,28 there are two possible equilib-
riums, but both such that type λ1 prefers not to borrow and the banker chooses in response to an
announcement ψ1 = 0 a spread γ1 > q− 14 . Type λ
1
in turn announces an intention to sell ψ1 = 78
units of indexed asset, and the banker’s reaction to such an announcement is to demand a spread
γ1 = 0. In period 1 type λ
1
will choose θ1 = 45 , for a total repayment equal to
7
10 .We have two pos-
sible equilibrium values for the price q: when the true realization of the agent’s type is λ1, we have
q = 3, and when its true realization is λ
1
we have q = 43 . So, when the agent is of type λ
1, both him
and the banker have the same utility under both rules, simply because the banker does not want to
trade with him. Under rule II, the banker and the consumer are better off when the consumer is of
type λ
1
, since he can signal that he is a relatively good payer. The consumers utility is improved
from ln 1 + ln 2 = 0.693 15 under rule I to ln
(
1 + 43
7
8
)
+ ln
(
2− 710
) − 34 ( 78 − 710) = 0.904 3, while
the banker’s payoff is improved from ln 3 + ln 1 = 1.0986 to ln
(
3− 43 78
)
+ ln
(
1 + 710
)
= 1.136 8.
4. Existence of Equilibrium
In this section we prove the following theorem:29
Theorem 4.1. If all agents’ utility functions are concave and strictly monotone in consumption,
if all bankers’ utility functions are concave and monotone, if rank A = P , if λhs > 0 for all
(s, h) ∈ S ×H, and if βbs > 0 ∀b ∈ B and ∀s ∈ S, then a pure strategies equilibrium exists for each
realization of λ ∈ Λ, when indexed assets are negotiated according to rule II.
4.1. Truncated Economy. Our proof will be done through finite dimensional approximations.
We start by truncating the economy, in terms of consumption bundles, asset portfolios, spreads,
and also agent types.
Specifically, we define a truncated economy EN as one in which:
28You can consider that instead of one agent there are 1000 exact copies of the same consummer, with types
perfectly positivelly correlated, and multiply also the banker’s endowment by 1000.
29Which holds wheather banker extract information from period zero prices or not.
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a) for each pair (h, s) the domain Λhs =
[
λhs , λ
h
s
]
is partitioned into N sub-intervals of equal
length. In subinterval ΛhsnN =
[
λhs +
n−1
N
(
λ
h
s − λhs
)
, λhs +
n
N
(
λ
h
s − λhs
)]
, 1 6 n 6 N, the value
of the default utility penalty of agent h in state s will be given by
λhsnN =
∫ λhs+ nN (λhs−λhs)
λhs+
n−1
N
(
λ
h
s−λhs
) λhsdσhs (λhs ),
b) agent h’s admissible consumption space is
XhN =
{
xh ∈ RL(SN
SH+1)
+ : x
h
0l 6 N ∀l ∈ L ∧ xhsl (λ) 6 N ∀ (s, l, λ) ∈ S × L× Λ
}
and his admissible portfolio space is
Y hN =
{(
φh, ψh
) ∈ RP+ × RB+ : φhp 6 N ∀p ∈ P ∧ ψbh 6 N ∀b ∈ B}
c) banker b’s admissible primitive asset portfolio space is
Y bN =
{
ϕb ∈ RP : ∣∣ϕbp∣∣ 6 N ∀p ∈ P}
and his admissible spread space is
ΓbN =
{
γb ∈ RH : ∣∣γbh∣∣ 6 N ∀h ∈ H} .
In the truncated economy EN , λhsN is a random variable with N possible realizations λhsnN , 1 6
n 6 N. Every player in the truncated economy EN will expect λhsN to assume the value λhsnN with
probability σhs (λ
h
snN ) = σ
h
s
([
λhs +
n−1
N
(
λ
h
s − λhs
)
, λhs +
n
N
(
λ
h
s − λhs
)])
. Let λN = (λhsN )
h∈H
s∈S , let
ΛN be the set of all possible realizations of the matrix λN , and let
σN = σ
([
λhs +
n−1
N
(
λ
h
s − λhs
)
, λhs +
n
N
(
λ
h
s − λhs
)]h∈H
s∈S
)
. Then the problem of each consumer in
the truncated economy EN is to maximize the following function
uh0 (x
h
0 ) +
∑
s∈S
αhs
∑
λN∈ΛN
[
us(xhs (λN ))− λhsNDhs (λN )
]
σN (λN |y0, λhN )
subject to the set
BhN (λN , γh, y0) =
{(
xh, φh, ψh
) ∈ XhN × Y hN : constraints 2.1, 2.5 and 2.6 are satisfied} .
Note that in this truncated economy we have a finite number of agents each one with a finite
number of types. Thus we can look at each type of the same agent in the truncated economy as a
different player. As N increases, the number of types tends to a continuum.
The problem of each banker becomes that of maximizing
vb0
(
p0w
b
0−qϕb−(δbq−γbh)
∑
h∈H ψ
b
h
p01
)
+
+
∑
s∈S
∑
λN∈ΛN β
b
sv
b
s
(
ps(λN )w
b
s+Asϕ
b+
∑
h∈H θ
h
s (λN )r
s
bψ
b
h
ps1(λN )
)
σN (λN |y0) if Dbe = 0
−∞ if Dbe > 0
where we redefine Dbe =
∑
s∈S
∑
λN∈ΛN β
b
sD
b
s(λN )σN (λN |y0), 30 over his feasible space Y bN × ΓbN .
Now, let Π0 =
{
(p0, q) ∈ RL+P+ : (p0, q) ∈ ∆L+P−1
}
be the set of admissible period 0 prices,
and let Πs (λN ) =
{
(ps (λN )) ∈ RL+ : pS (λN ) ∈ ∆L−1
}
be the set of state s ∈ S and matrix λ ∈ Λ
admissible prices.
30Dbe > 0 will be equivalent to having
ps(λN )w
b
s+Asϕ
b+
∑
h∈H θ
h
s (λN )r
s
bψ
b
h
ps1(λN )
< 0 for λN in positive measure subset
of ΛN .
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We now consider a generalized game JN for the truncated economy EN , where, in addition to
the above players, there is a fictitious player who choose y0 = (p0, q) ∈ Π0 in order to maximize
p0
(∑
h∈H
xh0 +
∑
b∈B
xb0 −
∑
h∈H
wh0 −
∑
b∈B
wb0
)
+ q
(∑
h∈H
φh +
∑
b∈B
ϕb
)
and another SNSH fictitious players, one for each state of nature and each realization λnN of the
matrix λN , who choose a price vector ps (λnN ) ∈ Πs (λnN ) in order to maximize
ps (λnN )
(∑
h∈H
xhs (λnN ) +
∑
b∈B
xbs (λnN )−
∑
h∈H
whs −
∑
b∈B
wbs
)
.
We now state and prove several auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. Each banker’s best response correspondence is upper semicontinuous, compact and
convex valued.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. The function
xb01N =
p0w
b
0 − qϕb −
∑
h∈H(δ
bq − γbh)ψbh
p01
is monotone in each γbh, h ∈ H, for each fixed ψbh (and under rule II the banker takes ψbh as given)
thus is simultaneously quasiconcave and quasiconvex in γbh. The above function is also monotone,
thus quasiconcave and quasiconvex, in each ϕbp, p ∈ P. Since a function h(x) defined as h(x) =
g(f(x)) is quasiconcave if f(x) is quasiconcave and g(·) is increasing, vb0
(
p0w
b
0−qϕb−(δbq−γbh)
∑
h∈H ψ
b
h
p01
)
is quasiconcave in the banker’s decision variables.31
The function
xbs1N =
ps(λN )wbs +Asϕ
b +
∑
h∈H θ
h
s (λN )r
s
bψ
b
h
ps1(λN )
is monotonic in each ϕbp, p ∈ P, and by remark 5.3 in the Appendix, θhs (λN ) is decreasing in γbh.
Hence, by the same argument above, the functions vbs are all quasiconcave
(
ϕb, γb
)
. Then the result
follows immediately from the compacity and convexity of Y bN × ΓbN .32 
Lemma 4.3. The generalized game JN has an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof of Lemma 4.3. The agents’ budget sets BhN (λN , γh, y0) are compact and convex valued
and their objective functions are continuous in all their choice variables. Hence, their best response
correspondences pihN (γh, y0, p1) are upper semicontinuous and compact valued. By quasiconcavity
of their objective functions, pihN (γh, y0, p1) is also convex valued. Similarly, each banker’s best
response correspondence pibN (y0, γ−b, ψ
b) is upper semicontinuous, compact and convex valued by
lemma 4.2. The same applies to the best response correspondence pi0N (x0, φ, ϕ) of the period 0
auctioneer and the best response correspondences pis,λnNN (xs(λnN )) of all the SN
SH second period
auctioneers. Then the product correspondence piN : M → M, where M = [0, N ]HL(SN
SH+1) ×
[0, N ]HP × [0, N ]HB × [0, 1]HSNSH × [−N,N ]BP × [−N,N ]BH ×∆L+P−1 × (∆L−1)SNSH , is also
31Under rule 1 ψbh would not be taken as fixed by the banker, but as a decreasing function of γ
b
h, and thus the
product γbhψ
b
h could be not monotone, rendering us unable to guarantee the quasiconcavity of the banker’s objective
function in the spreads.
32Strictly speaking, the banker’s objective function is discontinuous, but a banker can prevent his or her utility
from being equal to −∞ by simply not trading assets at all. For this, he or she only needs to demand sufficiently
high spreads such that no agent will want to borrow from him or her. If γbh = δ
bq 6 1, we are guaranteed of this.
So, we can ignore the positive default branch of a banker’s utility function for every N , and we can treat his utility
function as if it were continuous.
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upper semicontinuous and compact convex valued. Thus, by Kakutani’s Fixed point Theorem piN
has a fixed point
(
x∗, φ∗, θ∗, ψ∗, γ∗, δ̂∗, p∗0, q
∗, {p∗s(λnN )}λnN∈ΛNs∈S
)
. 
Lemma 4.4. The equilibrium of the generalized game JN constitutes an equilibrium of the trun-
cated economy EN , for N large enough.
Proof of Lemma 4.4. Each banker’s period 0 budget constraint holds with equality by construc-
tion. Aggregating all bankers’ period 0 budget constraints, we have
(4.1) p∗0N
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
0N + q
∗
N
∑
b∈B
ϕb
∗
N +
(
δbq∗N − γb∗hN
)∑
b∈B
∑
h∈H
ψb
∗
hN = p
∗
0N
∑
b∈B
wb0
Also, agents’s period 0 budget constraints must hold with equality, since their utility is strictly
increasing, and aggregating over all agents, we have
(4.2) p∗0N
∑
h∈H
xh
∗
0N + q
∗
N
∑
h∈H
φh
∗
N = p
∗
0N
∑
h∈H
wh0 +
∑
b∈B
∑
h∈H
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
ψb
∗
hN
and period 0 auctioneer’s optimality conditions imply
(4.3)
(∑
h∈H
xh
∗
0N +
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
0N −
∑
h∈H
wh0 −
∑
b∈B
wb0
)
+
(∑
h∈H
φh
∗
N +
∑
b∈B
ϕb
∗
N
)
6 0
Combining 4.1 and 4.2, we get
p∗0N
(∑
h∈H
xh
∗
0N +
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
0N −
∑
h∈H
wh0 −
∑
b∈B
wb0
)
+ q∗N
(∑
h∈H
φh
∗
N +
∑
b∈B
ϕb
∗
N
)
= 0.
Now, for N large enough, we must have p∗0lN > 0, ∀l ∈ L, since otherwise every agent would
choose xh
∗
0lN = N, contradicting (4.3). For any N we must also have q
∗
pN > 0, ∀p ∈ P, because
if we had q∗pN = 0 for any p then every agent and banker would choose φ
h∗
pN = N, so we would
have
∑
h∈H φ
h∗
N +
∑
b∈B ϕ
b∗
N > 0, implying that the auctioneer would want to choose q
∗
pN =
1, a contradiction. Also, by a classical non-arbitrage argument, no vector z ∈ RP such that
(−q∗Nz,Az)′ > 0 with strict inequality for at least one coordinate can exist, since bankers would
demand N units of the primitive assets p such that zP > 0 and supply N units of those with
zp < 0, contradicting again the optimality for the auctioneer. Then, we must have∑
h∈H
xh
∗
0N +
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
0N −
∑
h∈H
wh0 −
∑
b∈B
wb0 = 0.
and
(4.4)
∑
h∈H
φh
∗
N +
∑
b∈B
ϕb
∗
N = 0.
In every state s of period 1, and for every realization of the matrix λN , the budget constraints each
agent must hold with equality, again because their utility is strictly increasing, and aggregating all
agent’s budget constrains, we have
(4.5) p∗1sN (λN )
∑
h∈H
xh
∗
1sN (λN ) +
∑
h∈H
(
θh
∗
sN (λN )
∑
b∈B
rsbψ
b∗
hN
)
= p∗1sN (λN )
∑
h∈H
whs +As
∑
h∈H
φh
∗
N ,
∀ s ∈ S, ∀λN ∈ ΛN .
Since bankers cannot default in equilibrium, because this is incompatible with their utility
maximization, we must have Db
∗
sN (λN ) = 0 for every b, every s, and every λN ∈ ΛN . Their
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budget constraints must also hold with equality in period 1 for every s and every λN ∈ ΛN , thus
aggregating we have
(4.6) p∗1sN (λN )
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
1sN (λN ) = As
∑
b∈B
ϕb
∗
N+
+
∑
b∈B
∑
h∈H
[
rsbψ
b∗
hN −Dh
∗
sN (λN )
]
+ p∗1sN (λN )
∑
b∈B
wbs, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN
Now, state s and matrix λN auctioneer’s optimality conditions imply that,
(4.7)
(∑
h∈H
xh
∗
1sN (λnN ) +
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
1sN (λnN )−
∑
h∈H
whs −
∑
b∈B
wbs
)
6 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN
By definition, we have that∑
h∈H
(
θh
∗
sN (λN )
∑
b∈B
rsbψ
b∗
hN
)
=
∑
b∈B
∑
h∈H
[
rsbψ
b∗
hN −Dh
∗
sN (λN )
]
, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN
and using this in combination with (4.5), (4.6), and (4.4), we get,
p∗1sN (λN )
(∑
h∈H
xh
∗
1sN (λnN ) +
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
1sN (λnN )−
∑
h∈H
whs −
∑
b∈B
wbs
)
= 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN
We cannot have p∗1slN = 0 for N large enough, since every agent would choose x
h∗
1slN = N, and
that would contradict (4.7). Then we have(∑
h∈H
xh
∗
1sN (λnN ) +
∑
b∈B
xb
∗
1sN (λnN )−
∑
h∈H
whs −
∑
b∈B
wbs
)
= 0, ∀s ∈ S, ∀ λN ∈ ΛN
as we wanted to show. 
For what follows, when we use the expression ”uniformly bounded”, it should be understood as
uniformly bounded with respect to λ ∈ Λ.
Lemma 4.5. (x∗N )N=1,2,... is a uniformly bounded sequence.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. For period every state s ∈ S and good l, xh∗slN 6
∑
h∈H w
h
sl +
∑
b∈B w
b
sl,
∀N. Also xb∗s1N 6
∑
h∈H w
h
s1 +
∑
b∈B w
b
s1 for each s ∈ S and ∀N. 
Lemma 4.6. (γ∗N )N=1,2,... is a bounded sequence (from above and from below).
Proof of Lemma 4.6. If γb
∗
hN > δ
bq∗N for some N, then agent h would face a negative price on
his or her sale of indexed assets to banker b, so he or she would choose ψb
∗
hN = 0. If γ
b∗
hN < 0 for
some N agent b could profit in period zero, at the expense of banker b, by selling him or her N
units of indexed asset at unit price δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN and purchasing a portfolio of primitive assets with
weights exactly equal to δb, at unit price δbq∗N . In state s the net promised return would be simply
δbrsb − δbrsb = 0. Then
(
γb
∗
hN
)
N=1,2,...
∈
[
0, max
q∈∆P−1
(
δbq
)]
. 
Hence (γ∗N )N=1,2,... has a cluster point γ
∗.
Lemma 4.7. (φ∗N , ϕ
∗
N , ψ
∗
N )N=1,2,... is a bounded sequence.
Proof of Lemma 4.7. For each agent h and each N , let δh
∗
N ∈ ∆P−1 denote the relative weights
vector of his or her primitive assets portfolio φh
∗
N , that is, δ
h∗
pN = φ
h∗
pN/
∑
p∈P φ
h∗
pN .
(
δh
∗
N
)
N=1,2,...
has a cluster point δh
∗
. Let ξ ∈ ∆B−1, and let cξhN = maxs
(∑
b∈B ξbδ
bRs
′
/δh
∗
N R
s′
)
. Then
(i) If ξ is such that
∑
b∈B ξbδ
bRs
′
/δh
∗
N R
s′ is not constant across s, then γb
∗
hN must be such that∑
b∈B ξb
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
/q∗Nδ
h∗
N < c
ξ
hN . Otherwise, agent h could sell ξb units of indexed asset to
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banker b, buy cξhN units of portfolio δ
h∗
N , and in every state s would receive c
ξ
hNδ
h∗
N R
s′ >
∑
b∈B ξb
δbRs
′
, with strict inequality for at least one s, a sure profit.
(ii) Similarly, if ξ is such that
∑
b∈B ξbδ
bRs
′
/δh
∗
N R
s′ = cξhN for all s, then γ
b∗
hN must satisfy∑
b∈B ξb
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
/q∗Nδ
h∗
N 6 cbhN . 33
The agent’s first period budget constraint at the equilibrium of the truncated economy can be
written as
p∗0N (x
h∗
0N − wh0 ) + q∗Nδh
∗
N
∑
p∈P
φh
∗
pN − ψ
∗
hN
∑
b∈B
ξ∗bN
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
= 0,
where ψ
∗
hN =
∑
b∈B ψ
b∗
hN , and ξ
∗
bN = ψ
b∗
hN/
∑
b∈B ψ
b∗
hN . (ξ
∗
N )N=1,2,... has a cluster point ξ
∗. Now
(a) Suppose that
∑
b∈B ξ
∗
bNδ
bRs
′
/δh
∗
N R
s′ is not constant across s. Then, if
∑
p∈P φ
h∗
pN →
N
+∞
we have that
(
ψ
∗
hN
)
N=1,2,...
must diverge also to +∞, and at a relative rate superior to 1/cξ∗NhN , by
(i) above. Thus 0 >
(
δh
∗
N R
s′∑
p∈P φ
h∗
pN − ψ
∗
hN
∑
b∈B ξ
∗
bNδ
bRs
′
)
→
N
−∞ for at least one state s.
Even if the consumer sets xh1sN = 0 for every N, his or her default will be equal to(
ψ
∗
hN
∑
b∈B ξ
∗
bN
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)− δh∗N Rs′∑p∈P φh∗pN − p∗s (λN )whs) →N +∞, so he or she will suffer
a utility penalty equal to at least
min
λN
∈ΛN
λhsN
ψ∗hN ∑
b∈B
ξ∗bN
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
− δh∗N Rs
′ ∑
p∈P
φh
∗
pN − p∗s (λN )whs
→
N
+∞.
Let Uh(w) denote the value of agent h utility if he or she consumes the total aggregate endowment
of the economy. Uh(w) is finite, so we conclude that if
∑
p∈P φ
h∗
pN →
N
+∞ then agent h utility
would become negative.
(b) Suppose that
∑B
b=1 ξ
∗
bNδ
bRs
′
/δh
∗
N R
s′ = cξ
∗
N
hN for all s, and recall (ii) above. If∑b
b=1 ξ
∗
bN
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
/q∗Nδ
h∗
N < c
ξ∗N
hN the above argument remains valid. If∑b
b=1 ξ
∗
bN
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
/q∗Nδ
h∗
N = c
ξ∗N
hN , the agent can only profit at the expense of the bankers if
he or she defaults. But then to profit boundlessly he or she would have to default boundlessly
and his or her utility would become negative. If the agent does not default he or she does not
gain or loose anything if he or she lets
∑
p∈P φ
h∗
pN and ψ
∗
hN go to infinity. Note that in this case
the bankers for which lim
N
ξ∗bN > 0 are forced to make their short sales of primitive assets go to
infinity. Then we must have q∗δ̂b
∗
/
(
δbq∗ − γb∗h
)
= δ̂b
∗
Rs
′
/δbRs
′
for all s. Otherwise in the limit
the banker would be loosing or gaining boundlessly in either period 0 or in some state of nature
of period 1. Then, we can, without loss of generality, replace these sequences by bounded ones,
without affecting any other equilibrium variables.
Thus we have shown that lim
N
∑
p∈P φ
h∗
pN < +∞, for all h.We then have
∑B
b=1 ϕ
b∗
N = −
∑
h∈H φ
h∗
N 
−∞, by lemma 4.4, thus lim
N
q∗N
∑B
b=1 ϕ
b∗
N > −∞. This implies that if for some banker b̂ we had
lim
N
q∗Nϕ
b̂∗
N = −∞, then lim
N
q∗Nϕ
b˜∗
N = +∞ for some other banker b˜ 6= b̂. But for each banker q∗Nϕb
∗
N
is bounded from above by p∗0Nw
b
0, a contradiction.
(
q∗Nϕ
b∗
N
)
N=1,2,...
is hence bounded, and since
q∗N ∈ RP++ for N high enough, (ϕ∗N )N=1,2,... is bounded.
Finally, by the bankers’ budget constraints, (ψ∗N )N=1,2,... becomes bounded also. 
Lemma 4.8. lim
N
(
p∗0N , q
∗
N , {p∗1sN (λN )}s∈S
)
N=1,2,...
 0.
33We should expect the spreads to be higher than these lower bounds, due to the possibility of default.
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Proof of Lemma 4.8. Suppose p∗0lN →
N
0 for some l. Then, by preferences strict monotonicity,
xh
∗
0lN →
N
+∞ and xb∗0lN →
N
+∞. Similarly, if p∗1slN (λN ) →
N
0, there would be an order above
which
∑
h∈H x
h∗
1slN (λN ) >
∑
h∈H w
h∗
1sl +
∑B
b=1 w
b∗
1sl, contradicting the optimality for the (s, λN )
auctioneer in the generalized game JN . Finally, suppose q∗pN →
N
0 for some p. Then each agent can
fix q∗pφ
h
pN = kh > 0, such that φ
h
pN →
N
+∞ without increasing the expenditure in the purchase
of primitive asset p. Since aps > 0 with strict inequality for at least one s, their state s budget
constraints would explode. 
Let µh
∗
N (λN ) denote the set of Lagrange multipliers of agent h at his or her optimal solution
in the truncated economy EN . They depend on λN because the agents have, in each state s, a
different budget constraint for each realization of the matrix λN .
Lemma 4.9.
(
µh
∗
N (λN )
)
N=1,2,...
is a uniformly bounded sequence.
Proof of Lemma 4.9. The fact that each
(
µh
∗
sN (λN )
)
N=1,2,...
is bounded can be shown following
the same steps as in the proof of lemma 4 in Arau´jo, Monteiro and Pa´scoa [3]. As for
(
µh
∗
0N
)
N=1,2,...
we have the following inequality:
∂Lh
∂ψbh
= µh
∗
0
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
6
∑
s∈S
αhs
∑
λN∈ΛN
λhs (1− θh
∗
sN )r
s
bσN (λN |y∗0N , λhN )+
+
∑
s∈S
αhs
∑
λN∈ΛN
µh
∗
sN (λN )θ
h∗
sNr
s
bσN (λN |y∗0N , λhN ), ∀b ∈ B.
where Lh is the Lagrangian of agent h optimization problem. Then µh∗0 is bounded if
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
does not go to zero for at least one b. If lim
N
(
δbq∗N − γb
∗
hN
)
= 0 for all b, then the agent cannot
borrow anything in the limit. Thus, lim
N
µh
∗
0 = +∞ would imply that lim
N
xh
∗
0N = 0, and since we
have p∗0w
h
0 > 0, q
∗  0, and the agent’s period zero constraint must be holding with equality for
N high enough, we would then have lim
N
φh
∗
pN > 0 for at least one p, and then it would follow that
∂Lh
∂φhp
=
∑
s∈S
αhs
∑
λN∈ΛN
µh
∗
sN (λN )a
p
sσN (λN |y∗0N , λhN )− µ0q∗pN = 0,
a contradiction, due to lemma 4.8. 
Now define fN : Λ→ Rz (we do not specify z) :
fN (λ) = (µh
∗
N , x
h∗
N , φ
h∗
N , θ
h∗
N , x
b∗
N , ϕ
b∗
N , ψ
b∗
hN , γ
b∗
hN , p
∗
0N , q
∗
N , p
∗
sN )
b∈B
h∈H(
fN
)
N
is uniformly bounded, hence uniformly Lebesgue integrable. And the sequence∫
fN (λ) dσ (λ) converges, maybe passing to a subsequence. By Fatou’s lemma, there is a function
f : Λ→ Rz such that
(i) f (λ) = (µh
∗
, xh
∗
, φh
∗
, θh
∗
, xb
∗
, ϕb
∗
, ψb
∗
h , γ
b∗
h , p
∗
0, q
∗, p∗s)
b∈B
h∈H ∈ cl
{
fN (λ)
}
N∈N , for almost ev-
ery λ ∈ Λ.
(ii)
∫
f (λ) dσ (λ) = lim
N
∫
fN (λ) dσ (λ) .
We finally have to check if (µh
∗
(λ) , xh
∗
(λ) , xb
∗
(λ) , θh
∗
(λ) , p∗s (λ) , φ
h∗ , ϕb
∗
, ψb
∗
h , γ
b∗
h , p
∗
0, q
∗)b∈Bh∈H
is an equilibrium for the economy E . The market clearing conditions hold pointwise, and result
from the fact that the truncated economy EN is in equilibrium for N high enough and (i) above. To
verify the optimality for the agents, we must show that for each h @(xh (λ) , θh (λ) , φh, ψbh) budget
feasible such that
τ = uh0 (x
h
0 ) +
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
[
us(xhs (λ))− λhsDhs (λ)
]
dσ(λ|y0, λh)−
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−uh0 (xh
∗
0 )−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
[
us(xh
∗
s (λ))− λhsDh
∗
s (λ)
]
dσ(λ|y0, λh) > 0.
Following the same steps as in the proof of lemma 1 in Arau´jo, Monteiro and Pa´scoa [3], we
have, in the limit,
uh0 (x
h
0 ) +
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
us(xhs (λ))dσ(λ|y0, λh)− uh0 (xh
∗
0 )−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
us(xh
∗
s (λ))dσ(λ|y0, λh) 6
6 µh∗0 p∗0(xh0 − xh
∗
0 ) +
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µh
∗
s (λ) p
∗
s (λ) (x
h
s (λ)− xh
∗
s (λ))dσ(λ|y0, λh).
Then
τ 6 µh∗0 p∗0(xh0 − xh
∗
0 ) +
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µh
∗
s (λ) p
∗
s (λ) (x
h
s (λ)− xh
∗
s (λ))dσ(λ|y0, λh)−
−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
λhs
(
Dhs (λ)−Dh
∗
s (λ)
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh) 6
6 µh∗0 q∗
(
φh
∗ − φh
)
+ µh
∗
0
B∑
b=1
(
q∗δb − γb∗h
)
(ψbh − ψb
∗
h )+
+
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µh
∗
s (λ)
[
As
(
φh − φh∗
)
+
B∑
b=1
(
rsbψ
b∗
h − rsbψbh +Dhs (λ)−Dh
∗
s (λ)
)]
dσ(λ|y0, λh)−
−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
λhs
(
Dhs (λ)−Dh
∗
s (λ)
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh)
= µh
∗
0 q
∗
(
φh
∗ − φh
)
+ µh
∗
0
B∑
b=1
(
q∗δb − γb∗h
)
(ψbh − ψb
∗
h )+
+
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µh
∗
s (λ)As
(
φh − φh∗
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh)−
−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µh
∗
s (λ)
B∑
b=1
(
rsbψ
b
h − rsbψb
∗
h
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh)+
+
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
(µh
∗
s (λ)− λhs )
(
Dhs (λ)−Dh
∗
s (λ)
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh).
Now, Dh
∗
s (λ) =
∑B
b=1 r
s
bψ
b∗
h if λ
h
s < µ
h∗
s (λ) and D
h∗
s (λ) = 0 if λ
h
s > µ
h∗
s (λ) . Using the fact that
min
06Dhs (λ)6
∑B
b=1 r
s
bψ
b
h
− µh∗s (λ)
B∑
b=1
rsbψ
b
h + (µ
h∗
s (λ)− λhs )Dhs (λ) =
= −max
{
µh
∗
s (λ) , λ
h
s
} B∑
b=1
rsbψ
b
h
we have
τ 6 µh∗0 q∗
(
φh
∗ − φh
)
+ µh
∗
0
B∑
b=1
(
q∗δb − γb∗h
)
(ψbh − ψb
∗
h )+
+
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µh
∗
s (λ)As
(
φh − φh∗
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh)−
−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
max
{
µh
∗
s (λ) , λ
h
s
} B∑
b=1
(
rsbψ
b
h − rsbψb
∗
h
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh).
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By the same steps in the proof of lemma 3 in Arau´jo, Monteiro and Pa´scoa [3], with the slight
difference that here we also have to make xh0 = x
h∗
0 , we have
0 6
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
max
{
µh
∗
s (λ) , λ
h
s
} B∑
b=1
(
rsbψ
b
h − rsbψb
∗
h
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh)−
−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µh
∗
s (λ)As
(
φh − φh∗
)
dσ(λ|y0, λh)+
−µh∗0 q∗
(
φh
∗ − φh
)
− µh∗0
B∑
b=1
(
q∗δb − γb∗h
)
(ψbh − ψb
∗
h ) = −τ.
Hence τ 6 0, as we wanted to show.
Finally, the optimality for the bankers results immediately from the upper semicontinuity of
their best response correspondence in the limit, since no price tends to zero by lemma 4.8.34
5. Appendix
5.1. Agent’s Individual Choice Problem Analysis. In this Appendix, we derive formally the
agents’ first order necessary conditions. The set of first order necessary and sufficient Kuhn-Tucker
conditions with regard to the asset portfolio and to the repayment rates is (ignoring dependencies
on λ to spare some space):
(5.1)
∂Lh
∂φhp
=
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µsa
p
sdσ(λ|y0, λh)− µ0qp 6 0, φhp > 0 and φhp
∂Lh
∂φhp
= 0,∀p ∈ P.
(5.2)
∂Lh
∂ψbh
= µ0(δbq − γbh)−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
λhs (1− θhs )rsbdσ(λ|y0, λh)−
−
∑
s∈S
αhs
∫
Λ
µsθ
h
s r
s
bdσ(λ|y0, λh) 6 0, ψbh > 0, and ψbh
∂Lh
∂ψh
= 0
∂Lh
∂θhs
= λhs r
s
bψ
b
h − µsrsbψbh − µ2s 6 0, θhs > 0 and θhs
∂Lh
∂θhs
= 0
∀s ∈ S and a.e. λ ∈ Λ.
where µs, is the state s budget constraint multiplier, i.e., the state s marginal income utility,
s ∈ S, and µ2s is the multiplier of the constraint θhs 6 1, s ∈ S.
Remark 5.1. By looking at conditions (5.2) we conclude that when γbh
35 decreases ψbh must
increase, except maybe if the agents are in a corner solution with ψbh = 0, because
∂Lh
∂ψbh
would
otherwise become positive. When ∂L
h
∂ψbh
is positive, to re-equate it to zero is necessary to decrease
µ0 and (if θhs > 0) increase µs for every s ∈ S, by transferring more income from period 1 to period
0, that is to say, by selling more indexed assets.36
Remark 5.2. By monotonicity the budget constraint will always hold with equality (µs > 0), and
if θhs is different from 0 and 1 (partial default) we will have
∂Lh
∂θhs
= 0 and µ2s = 0, which implies that
λhs = µs, equal to the nominal income marginal utility. If θ
h
s = 0, we have
∂Lh
∂θhs
< 0 and µ2s = 0,
which implies λhs < µs. If, on the contrary, θ
h
s = 1, we will then have
∂Lh
∂θhs
= 0 and µ2s > 0, implying
λhs > µs. By strict monotonicity, and assuming that u
h
s is homothetic just to make the graphical
34Remember that none of his or her choices depend on λ.
35The efective one under rule I, and the expected under rule II.
36Note that througout this analysis we are treating p0, q and ps(λ) as constants.
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illustration simple, the income marginal utility µs will strictly monotonically diminish as we move
up along the income expansion path. In this path there will exist a single point satisfying λhs = µs.
We will denote it by x∗. The lower λhs is, the further away from the origin the point x
∗ will be. All
points at the income expansion path below x∗ are such that λhs < µs, and vice-versa. Given the
agent’s asset portfolio and given the price vector ps, his or her budget constraint position is solely
determined by his or her repayment rate. Thus, there are three possible alternatives, represented
in figures 5 (λhs low), 6 (λ
h
s intermediate), and 7 (λ
h
s high). All admissible consumption bundles
are those below the θhs = 0 budget constraint. The optimal consumption bundle x
h
s will always be
located on the income expansion path between these two extreme budget constraints.
Insert figure 5 here.
Insert figure 6 here.
Insert figure 7 here.
With the help of this simple figures, several basic comparative analysis can be performed: if the
endowment or the portfolio of primitive asset is increased, θhs is increased; if the debt is increased
θhs decreases.
Remark 5.3. Combining remarks 5.1 and 5.2, it is immediate that θhs (λ) is decreasing in the
effective γhb , for every s ∈ S and λ ∈ Λ, under rule I. Under rule II, this conclusion is also true but
a bit less obvious. When γhb increases the agent will have less resources available for consumption
in period 0, implying an increase in µ0 and thus, by condition 5.1, the agent will decrease his
purchases of primitive assets and, by the statement in the last phrase in remark 5.2, θhs (λ) will
decrease. The intuition is very simple: higher spreads represent a contraction in the agent’s budget
set, making him poorer, and poorer consumers will default more, ceteris paribus.
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